Are private transfers altruistically motivated ? : the case of Nepal by Kang Sung Jin et al.
Are private transfers altruistically motivated
? : the case of Nepal
著者 Kang Sung Jin, Sawada Yasuyuki
発行年 2003
著作の一部 Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences
discussion paper series ~ no. 1020
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/697
 
Are Private Transfers Altruistically Motivated?  
The Case of Korea before and during the Financial Crisis*  
 
 
 
Sung Jin Kang** 
University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan 
 
and  
 
Yasuyuki Sawada 
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan 
 
 
August, 2002 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using household panel data from Korea for 1995-1998, this paper shows that private 
transfers of Korean households are altruistically motivated. Moreover, although the 
altruistic motive of households seemed to be reinforced during the financial crisis, the 
amount of private transfers was still not sufficient to support households living in urban 
areas.  Also, there had been a strong crowding-out relation between private and public 
transfers. This suggests that the Korean government could have designed its public 
transfer scheme in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency of its social safety net 
programs.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Asian financial crisis was truly a watershed in Korea’s economic history.  
With the onset of the crisis, the country’s real GDP and real wage contracted by 5.8 and 
10 percent, respectively, between 1997 and 1998.  Unemployment rate jumped from 
2.6 percent to 6.8 percent and inflation rose to 7.5 percent (Bank of Korea 2001; 
National Statistical Office 2001).  As a result of the economic downturn, poverty 
increased substantially in the country—the 7.5 percent share of poor urban households 
in the first quarter of 1997 jumped to 23 percent by the third quarter of 1998.  Also, the 
Gini coefficient in terms of per capita income of urban households increased from 0.27 
in 1997 to 0.30 in 1998 (Kakwani 2000; World Bank 2000).   
In the face of crisis-induced shocks, Korean households were forced to take 
drastic measures to protect their living standards.  In fact, the World Bank (2000) 
reports that Korea was able to weather the crisis through effective coping policies. 
Furthermore, Goh, Kang and Sawada (2001) find that private transfers played a 
significant role in protecting households in the face of crisis. Private income transfers 
are important for reallocating resources. The importance of private transfers addresses 
the following issues: the motives of private income transfers and the crowding-out 
effect of public transfers on private transfers.  
Using the Korean Household Panel Survey (KHPS) data, this paper tests for 
two competing hypotheses of transfer provision motives and crowding-out effects, i.e., 
the altruism and the self-interested exchange.  These two motives imply different 
outcomes of public transfers, redistributing income (Cox 1987). Altruistically  
motivated private transfers could lead to ineffective public transfers (Becker 1974). On 
the other hand, for households that are motivated by exchange, these results do not hold 
(Cox 1987). 
In contrast to the somewhat mixed existing empirical findings for other 
countries, the empirical results in this paper clearly show that Korean households are 
altruistically motivated. Accordingly, there had been a strong substitutability between 
private and public transfers. While Korea was able to weather the crisis through the 
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expansion of public transfers, these empirical results suggest that the government 
should have designed targeting schemes carefully in order to prevent such crowding-out 
effect of its social safety net programs.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides some theoretical 
background from existing work on public and private transfers.  Section 3 gives 
descriptive evidences and Section 4 discusses the estimation model and results.  The 
final section concludes.  
 
2. Literature 
 
Previous studies on private transfers identify two motives of private transfers 
(Cox 1987, 1990): altruism (Becker 1974) and self-interested exchange (Bernheim, 
Shleifer and Summers 1985).  Households transfer resources out of feelings of altruism 
that implicitly determines the receiving household’s consumption.  Alternatively, 
donors give private transfers in order to receive something in exchange for their 
transfers in times of need.  
The distinction between the altruistic and the exchange models has an 
important policy implication (Cox 1987; Cox and Jimenez 1990).  Becker (1974), in 
his altruistic model, argues that public transfer programs will have little effect on the 
distribution of economic welfare.  Under altruism, public transfers reduce the pre-
transfer marginal utility of the recipient’s consumption.  Hence, if government were to 
tax the donor and give the proceeds to the recipient, the donor’s intention to transfer 
will fade and she/he may decide to give less private transfers.  This cutting back of 
private transfers in response to public redistribution is called the “crowding out” effect 
of public transfers.  Thus, the Becker's altruism model predicts that public transfers 
tend to displace private transfers.   
On the other hand, exchange-motivated transfers interact with public transfers 
in a different way.  If transfers are motivated by exchange where the recipient 
compensates the donor by providing him some kind of services, public transfers will 
have little effect on private transfers (Cox 1987).  In contrast to the assumption of the 
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Becker’s (1974) altruism model, the exchange model argues that crowding out between 
private and public transfers does not necessarily occur.  Moreover, under exchange 
motive, public transfers may even increase the probability of receipts by providing 
donors additional source of income. In this case, an expansion of social insurance by 
government will increase the size of the risk-sharing pool and may act as an effective 
social safety net device for households. 
Existing evidences on the extent and magnitude of the crowding-out effect of 
public transfers are mixed.  Some studies find that public transfers have little effect on 
private ones (e.g., Cox and Jakubson 1995; Cox and Rank 1992; Altonji, Hayashi and 
Kotlikoff 1992, 1997; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994) while others (e.g., Cox and 
Jimenez 1992, 1995; Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998; Jensen 2002) have indicated that the 
possibility for crowding out to occur can be quite large.  For example, Cox and 
Jimenez (1995) estimate that if unemployment insurance system were introduced in the 
Philippines, private transfers would fall so much that the intended beneficiaries of the 
program would scarcely be any better off.  In contrast, they find that the degree of 
crowding out associated with pensions is much less significant.  
However, in East Asia, many households are likely to be altruistically linked 
through a widespread and operative informal transfer network.  From the assumption 
that as public transfers increase, altruistically-linked private transfer donors may 
cutback their private transfer provisions, a government subsidy intended only for those 
people in need may indirectly benefit donors who are often from the upper-income 
brackets and protected from exogenous shocks.  Hence, a quantitative assessment of 
the altruistic model is very important.  If the assumption of the altruism model is 
verified, that is crowding-out effect is proved to exist, government is then suggested to 
have careful targeting schemes to ensure the effectiveness of its social safety net 
programs. 
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3. Descriptive Evidence 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The main data source is the Korean Household Panel Survey (KHPS) that 
covers all prefectures except Jeju-do.  Based on a stratified random sampling by street 
block, this data is collected through household- and individual-level multipurpose 
surveys.1 This paper employs the survey data for 1995-1998. Each round covers from 
August to July next year.  The 1998 round is considered to reflect the period of the 
crisis since it covers from August 1997 to July 1998.  Income and expenditure 
variables are converted into real value by using provincial consumer price indices. 
 
3.2 The impact of the crisis on household income and consumption 
 
Table 1 shows that total income increased by 10 percent between 1995 and 
1997.  Labor income increased by 6.8 percent while asset income increased by 18 
percent—constituting 71 and 19 percent of total income in 1997, respectively.  Public 
and private transfers also increased but occupied only a small percentage of total 
income, i.e., 3.7 percent in 1997. 
However, with the onset of the crisis, per capita total income fell by 24.1 
percent between 1997 and 1998.  The two major income categories—labor and asset 
income—dropped by 26.7 and 40.8 percent, respectively.  Private transfers remained 
the same.  Public transfers, on the other hand, rose by 38.7 percent.  Although 
transfer income occupied only a small share of total income, its share increased from 
3.7 percent to 5.3 percent in contrast to the decrease of the share of labor income from 
71.0 percent to 68.5 percent. 
With the contraction of the economy, rising unemployment and falling income, 
household expenditure also dropped by 20.9 percent in the same period.  The largest 
                                                        
1 The data structure follows the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) data of US. 
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drop of 64.1 percent was in the consumption on luxurious items (durables and dining 
out), 16.7 percent in food consumption, and 23.7 percent in consumption on education 
(which includes expenses for extracurricular activities and additional after-school 
classes).  Although the consumptions on food and education fell in absolute terms 
during the crisis, they constituted a higher proportion of household budgets—30.5 
percent of total expenditure.  The share of expenditure on nondurables remained 
almost the same as 26.1 and 25.3 percent, respectively, while that of luxury expenditure 
fell from 9.7 percent to 4.4 percent.  This suggests that average households were 
cutting back consumption on non-essential items to weather the crisis and protect 
consumptions on food and education. 
Table 2 shows that the percentage of households that received private and public 
transfers had increased since 1995.  Throughout the period, there was an increasing 
trend in the number of households receiving private and public transfers.  The 
percentage of households that received private and public transfers rose from 18.3 and 
9.3 percent in 1997 to 21.7 and 16.3 percent in 1998, respectively.  This evidence 
suggests that private and public transfers served as important risk-coping devices during 
the financial crisis. 
Furthermore, Table 3 reports the percentage of recipients of private and public 
transfers by characteristic of household head.  By gender, there was no remarkable 
change over time.  Throughout the period, the percentage of male-headed households 
is higher than that of female-headed households.  However, considering that the 
percentage of female-headed households is just about 10 percent of total sample, it can 
be said that female-headed households received more private and public transfers than 
male-headed households.  By area, the percentage of rural households is higher than 
that of urban households and there was no significant change in the distribution of 
private transfers among these households.  With respect to public transfers, while the 
percentage of urban households dropped by 6.0 percent, the percentage of rural 
households increased by 3.0 percent.   
By occupation, households with unemployed or non-paid heads occupied, not 
surprisingly, the highest share. In addition, it seems that they were provided more by 
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private transfers than public transfers during the crisis since their percentage of received 
private transfers increased by 3.2 percent, contrasts to the 5.5 percent fall in their 
percentage of received public transfers.  By educational level, household heads with 
primary or less education covered the largest share.  Overall, there was almost no 
change observed by educational level even during the crisis. 
One of the key premises for private transfer is that it responds to capital market 
imperfection. If this is true, transfer receipts should be more frequent in phase of the 
life-cycle when desired consumption exceeds current earnings. If households prefer to 
smooth consumption over the life-cycle and transfers help to do that, then the young and 
the old receive more transfers than the middle-aged. Thus the timing of transfers is very 
important. 
Table 4 reports the pattern of private and public transfers by age of household 
head.  Households with heads above 60 years old and below 36 years old tended to 
receive more private and public transfers.  In 1998, for instance, households with 
heads above 60 years old received about 480 thousand won per capita of private 
transfers and those with heads below 35 years old received 230 thousand won. On the 
other hand, households with heads of 36-60 years old received only 70 thousand won as 
private transfers.  Moreover, households with heads above 60 years old tended to 
receive more public transfers than other households.  This is not surprising since 
public transfers consist mainly of pensions. 
 
3.3 Private and public transfers as social safety nets  
 
One of the main concerns of this paper is to assess the role of private and 
public transfers as social safety net during the crisis.  Table 5 shows the trend of 
private and public transfers by per capita pre-transfer income decile.  
In terms of per capita pre-transfer income decile, the poorest 10 percent group 
received the largest amount of private transfers, e.g., 1016 thousand won in 1998.  
Interestingly, during the crisis, the private transfer network was expanded to the next 
lowest three deciles—transfers increased by 98% in 1998 for households in the lowest 
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30% decile.   
The poorest 10 percent group also received the largest amount of public 
transfers, which is composed mainly of financial supports received by the poor from 
government or social organization rather than pensions.  Moreover, during the crisis, 
middle-percentile groups tended to receive more public transfers.  The amount of 
public transfer to the richest 10 percent and 20 percent also dropped by 25 percent and 
15 percent, respectively. 
Table 6 summarizes the ingredients of public transfers in 1998.  The average 
amount of per capita public transfers includes national pensions, financial supports from 
the government or social organizations, and unemployment insurance.  Table 6 shows 
that the poorest half of total households received more than the average amount of total 
public transfers (85.8 thousands won).  Financial supports from the government or 
social organizations, as expected, played a major role in helping the poor.  However, 
the larger average amount of pension relative to that of supports from the government 
and social organization suggests that most of public transfers may have served more as 
permanent sources of extra income rather than as temporal safety net devices.  The role 
of unemployment insurance was negligible since the coverage of an official 
unemployment insurance program was expanded substantially only after October 1998.2  
 
4. Estimation 
 
4.1 Empirical Model Specification 
  
Under the altruistic motive, the variable determining whether a transfer occurs 
depends on the difference between the donor’s marginal utility of consumption and the 
recipient’s marginal utility of consumption (Cox 1987). A rise in the recipient’s pre-
transfer income reduces transfers because it lowers the donor’s marginal utility from 
transferring income to her/him. So the richer the recipient is, the less likely for him to 
                                                        
2 The new formal unemployment insurance scheme expanded its coverage from firms with more 
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receive a transfer. 
On the other hand, the exchange motive predicts that the latent variable 
determining the transfer decision is inversely related to pre-transfer income of recipient 
because increases of pre-transfer income reduces the chances that transfers are mutually 
beneficial.  
In order to identify the motives of private transfers quantitatively, we employ 
the empirical model of Cox (1987) and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez’ (1998).  For the 
decision whether a transfer occurs, the following stochastic model of the latent variable 
that determines private transfer receipts of household i at time t:  
 
(1) ittiitititit uuXPUTyPRT εβαα +++++= 21 , 
 
where PRT is a latent variable of private transfers which is observed only when positive. 
Per capita pre-transfer income and public transfers are represented by y and PUTit,  
respectively. The matrix, X, includes various household characteristics. The last term, ε, 
represents the well-behaved stochastic error term. In order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we also include time- and household-fixed effect, ui and ut, respectively, 
where the latter is expected to capture the aggregate effects of the financial crisis.  
 Dependent variable of Equation (1) is a latent variable which can be observed 
only when positive. Therefore, we estimate the binary transfer functions by defining the 
following binary variables: 
 
(2)      δPRTit = 1  if  PRTit > 0, 
     = 0   otherwise 
  
Since Equation (1) includes household fixed effects, we employ Chamberlain’s (1981) 
conditional likelihood function and estimate the logit model with fixed effects.  We 
estimate private and public transfers separately by assuming that the error term, ε, in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
than 30 employees to all firms as well as to temporary and daily workers. 
 10
Equation (1) is independent and uncorrelated with PUT and X. This assumption may be 
plausible since most of unobserved factors that affect private and public transfers will 
be captured by household and time fixed effects.  
Note that, per capita pre-transfer income is included as an independent variable. 
The key to identify transfer motives is the sign for the pre-transfer income coefficient in 
the decision versus the amount equation. Cox (1987) find that the comparative statistics 
results for the transfer decision are the same for both transfers motivated by altruism 
and exchange.  This finding implies that information on transfer decisions alone is 
insufficient for making inferences about transfer motives.  Thus the estimated 
coefficient for pre-transfer income in equation (1) is not enough to identify transfer 
motives.  
Yet, through estimation of the transfer amount equation, we can identify the 
transfer motives since the exchange motive predicts a negative coefficient for recipient 
pre-transfer income, while the altruistic motive predicts a negative sign for pre-transfer 
income equation (Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992). Hence, we also estimate the transfer 
amount equation as follows  
 
(3)           0  21 >+++++= ititititititit PRT  ifεuuγXPUTβyβPRT . 
 
For estimation, instead of using a household fixed effect Tobit model which 
uses the trimmed least absolute deviation estimator developed by Honoré (1992), we 
use a random effect Tobit model since the estimation method for fixed effect Tobit 
model is still under the active front-line research and there is no practically reliable 
computation methodology which is appropriate for our data (Lee 2002). In the random 
effect Tobit model, the household specific term, ui, is a stochastic variable. The 
likelihood function to estimate random effect Tobit model involves integration over the 
household random effects, ui. We utilized an approximation of the likelihood with 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature.  Following Cox (1987), the sign hypothesis for 1β  is 
positive under exchange and negative under altruism. If the estimated coefficient on 
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public transfers, 2β , is negative, it indicates the magnitude of the crowding-out effect 
of public transfers 
In Equations (1) and (3), the matrix of other control variables, X, includes the 
household head’s characteristics such as age, education level and occupation and the 
household’s demographic characteristics.  We have two specific comments on the 
selection of independent variables.   
First, we include age variables of household head because, as Cox (1990) 
emphasized, the timing of transfers over the life cycle is important especially for 
households facing liquidity constraints.  If households are subject to binding 
borrowing constraints the transfer receipts will be concentrated at early age when 
current resources are low.  Although even developing countries have public pensions, 
most of these apply only to urban workers in the formal sector (World Bank, 1989), 
Thus, old family members are likely to be dependent on informal supports from young 
family members. 
Second, in order to capture the effect of transfer network of an extended family, 
we enter variables representing residential area, gender of household head, family size, 
and the number of children and elderly as a household’s characteristics.  Particularly, 
the number of children will be an important determinant of public transfers in light of 
the old-age insurance motives of having many children.  In addition, larger households 
are likely to obtain a large amount of public transfers since they have more members to 
support. 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
  
Table 7 reports the logit and Tobit estimation results. In order to examine the 
impact of the crisis on private transfers, we conducted separate estimations for the entire 
period, i.e., 1995-1998, before the crisis period, i.e., 1995-97 and during the crisis 
period, i.e., 1998. In the first two columns with the entire sample, year dummies are 
significantly positive and increasing over time, indicating that overall private transfers 
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have increased. 
Before the crisis, the coefficient of per capita pre-transfer income is statistically 
insignificant which leads to difficulty in identifying the motives of private transfers in 
terms of decision while its coefficient on amount is shown negative and significant. 
These results together suggest that the altruistic motive of private transfers existed 
before the crisis.  In addition, a significant crowding-out effect between private and 
public transfers is observed, since the coefficient of public transfers is strongly negative 
and significant, a finding which is consistent with previous findings for other countries 
(e.g., Cox and Jimenez 1990, 1995; Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998; Jensen 2002).  As for 
the effects of occupational characteristics, households whose heads are unemployed or 
non-paid workers and engaged in agriculture and fisheries were clearly targeted by 
private transfers.  On the other hand, households with self-employed heads appear to 
receive significantly less private transfers.  With respect to the age variables, the 
coefficient of age of the household head is significantly negative whereas that of age 
squared is significantly positive.  These results suggest that the amount of private 
transfers tend to decrease initially as the household head gets older and then begin to 
increase again at a certain age level, possibly reflecting the liquidity constraints of old 
age group (Cox 1990).   
On the other hand, during the financial crisis, pre-transfer income has negative 
and significant coefficient in both the decision and amount equations, indicating clearly 
that private transfers were altruistically motivated. This result suggests that the altruistic 
motive of households was reinforced during the crisis, that consequently allowed poor 
Korean households to depend on informal transfers.  However, we should note that 
there is still a strong crowding-out effect between private and public transfers, implying 
that the effectiveness and efficiency of the government’s interventions was diluted 
significantly.   
Through comparisons of results before and after the financial crisis, we can 
infer that urban households suffered from the lack of private transfer since the 
coefficient of urban residence dummy became significantly negative during the crisis.  
These results suggest that although the financial crisis activated altruistically motivated 
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private transfer networks, urban households were still in need of informal financial 
supports.   
Other findings during the crisis are similar to those before the crisis, which can 
be summarized as follows.  First, households whose heads are unemployed or non-paid 
workers and those engaged in agriculture, fisheries and part-time jobs were targeted by 
private transfers. Second, larger households tended to receive less private transfers.  
On the other hand, households with more elderly were well targeted by private transfers. 
Third, the significant positive coefficients for female-headed household indicate that 
female-headed households are more likely to receive transfers, and in larger amounts 
than male-headed households—a consistent pattern across countries (Lucas and Stark 
1985; Kaufman and Lindauer 1986; Cox 1987; Cox and Jimenez 1989).  We should 
note that this result is not due to the poverty of female-headed households, since even 
after holding current income constant—comparing transfer amounts across households 
with similar income levels—the same pattern persists.  One possible reason for this 
finding is simply that females tend to live longer than males and may get more of old-
age transfers through an altruistically-linked informal network and formal channel.  
Another reason may be that private transfers compensate females for wage 
discrimination in the formal labor market.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Through estimation of econometric model with household-level panel data both 
before and during the crisis in Korea, this paper investigated motives and crowding-out 
effects of private transfers.  The estimation results show that the transfer behavior of 
Korean households is altruistically motivated especially during the crisis. Yet, the 
amount of altruistically-motivated private transfers was not sufficient for households 
living in urban areas. Also, there had been a strong crowding-out effect of public 
transfers on private transfers. 
In general, we may conclude that Korean households were well protected by 
inter- and/or intra-household transfers and public transfers during the crisis. However, 
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the evidence of a strong crowding-out effect between private and public transfers 
suggests that the government should have designed its targeting schemes carefully in 
order to improve effectiveness and efficiency of its social safety net programs.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Age of head 47.1 48.0 48.8 50.2 
Household size 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 
     
Total income 708.5 784.3 779.5 592.0 
Pre-transfer income 688.5 757.9 749.4 561.0 
Labor income 518.4 553.1 553.5 405.6 
Asset income 122.0 152.3 144.3 85.4 
Transfer income 19.6 26.2 29.0 31.4 
Private transfers 13.3 20.5 22.8 22.8 
Public transfers 6.3 5.7 6.2 8.6 
Other income 51.6 58.5 55.5 73.7 
     
Outstanding debt (formal bank loans,  203.8 238.5 217.1 300.6 
informal and personal loans)     
Financial assets (saving accounts, shares, bonds, 
insurances, and loans) 236.8 278.8 274.0 285.7 
     
Total Expenditure 628.4 539.7 543.7 430.0 
Non-durable 145.0 137.6 142.0 108.7 
Food 97.9 99.1 101.1 84.2 
Housing 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Clothing 26.3 23.6 23.2 14.8 
Education 54.0 56.9 61.5 46.9 
Medical and child care 32.2 17.2 18.0 17.2 
Luxury (durables and dining out)  67.3 59.0 52.6 18.9 
Car 128.0 68.1 61.7 36.7 
Public utilities 186.3 183.1 189.2 182.0 
Others  14.9 16.4 17.5 19.7 
     
Number of households 2985 2676 2536 2215 
Note: Income and expenditure values are in 10,000 Korean won per capita household  
at constant 1995 prices. 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Transfer Recipients by Year (%) 
 
 Private Public Total Households 
     
1995 13.1 6.2 17.9 2985 
1996 16.7 6.5 20.9 2676 
1997 18.3 9.3 22.8 2536 
1998 21.7 16.3 30.6 2215 
Total 
 
15.3 7.8 20.1 13977 
 
 17
 
Table 3 
Percentage of Transfer Recipients  
by Characteristic of Household Head 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Private Transfers     
      
Gender Female 24.9 27.3 26.3 26.3 
 Male 75.1 72.7 73.7 73.7 
Region Urban 40.8 37.7 34.8 34.6 
 Rural 59.2 62.3 65.2 65.4 
Occupation Salaried 19.7 13.5 13.6 12.3 
 Self-employed 11.8 11.0 9.7 9.2 
 Farmers and 
Fishers 
27.4 31.6 33.9 32.6 
 Unemployed and
non-paid  
41.2 44.0 42.8 46.0 
Education Primary or less 46.7 53.8 51.0 49.2 
 Secondary 37.5 31.6 37.2 36.0 
 Tertiary 15.8 14.6 11.9 14.8 
      
Public Transfers      
      
Gender Female 22.1 21.8 23.2 22.9 
 Male 77.9 78.2 76.8 77.1 
Region Urban 39.3 31.6 30.9 24.9 
 Rural 60.8 68.4 69.1 72.1 
Occupation Salaried 18.9 13.8 14.0 10.0 
 Self-employed 8.7 9.8 5.5 11.9 
 Farmers and 
Fishers 
26.5 29.9 30.1 33.2 
 Unemployed and
Non-paid  
46.0 46.6 50.4 44.9 
Education  Primary or less 44.6 44.8 53.0 48.9 
 Secondary 40.3 43.1 37.3 40.3 
 Tertiary 15.1 12.1 9.8 10.8 
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Table 4 
Average Per capita Private and Public Transfers 
by Age of Household Head 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
     
Private Transfers     
      
(Age)      
20-25 7.1 0 0 14.7 4.3 
26-30 23.5 27.2 48.9 24.3 19.2 
31-35 6.7 6.3 18.2 30.2 9.3 
36-40 4.6 5.8 3.4 7.7 4.3 
41-45 3.0 3.4 9.8 7.7 4.8 
46-50 4.2 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 
51-55 4.9 5.4 7.7 7.3 5.2 
56-60 8.4 17.0 24.1 10.5 13.5 
61-65 17.9 32.6 36.6 38.6 28.5 
66-70 51.4 81.6 49.1 57.4 58.4 
Above 70 59.0 90.0 89.6 78.9 75.5 
      
      
Public Transfers     
      
(Age)      
20-25 0 19.0 0 2.0 4.0 
26-30 0 4.6 11.7 20.8 3.9 
31-35 2.4 1.8 3.3 6.7 2.1 
36-40 3.6 2.0 3.1 1.0 2.1 
41-45 1.3 1.0 0.6 2.1 1.0 
46-50 2.5 0.4 0.7 1.9 1.4 
51-55 3.7 5.9 4.9 5.3 4.2 
56-60 5.9 5.1 4.6 7.9 5.0 
61-65 23.1 17.4 13.6 5.4 14.0 
66-70 18.6 19.7 22.4 26.3 18.9 
Above 70 
 
12.9 13.3 14.6 29.6 15.7 
  Note: Values are in 10,000 Korean won at constant 1995 prices. 
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Table 5 
Average Per capita Private Transfers by Decile 
 
Percentile 1995 1996 1997 1998 Change96-97(%)
Change 
97-98(%) 
     
Private transfers     
       
10 66.5 118.7 112.1 101.6 -5.6 -9.4 
20 8.6 21.0 24.4 32.1 16.2 31.6 
30 8.8 8.9 12.2 22.9 37.1 97.7 
40 4.3 8.4 7.2 12.8 -14.3 77.8 
50 2.4 8.7 9.0 7.2 3.5 -20.0 
60 2.6 3.6 7.1 4.7 97.2 -33.8 
70 8.6 8.0 8.0 4.3 0.0 -46.3 
80 6.9 4.7 20.9 13.3 344.7 -36.4 
90 8.5 12.3 9.8 7.0 -20.3 -28.6 
100 12.0 12.8 22.7 11.6 77.3 -48.9 
     
     
Public transfers     
       
10 24.2 28.6 27.6 30.0 -3.5 8.7 
20 7.7 1.0 7.7 6.8 670.0 -11.7 
30 4.1 3.9 5.7 13.2 46.2 131.6 
40 2.2 2.5 2.3 8.2 -8.0 256.5 
50 2.9 1.3 1.5 8.8 15.4 486.7 
60 4.3 2.3 1.8 2.9 -21.7 61.1 
70 3.7 3.4 3.4 5.4 0.0 58.8 
80 1.4 3.6 2.0 3.3 -44.4 65.0 
90 4.7 2.7 4.0 3.4 48.2 -15.0 
100 
 
7.5 6.5 6.0 4.5 -7.7 -25.0 
  Note: Values are in 10,000 Korean won at constant 1995 prices. 
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Table 6 
Average Per capita Public Transfers in 1998 by Category and Decile 
 
Percentile Pension 
Financial supports 
from the 
government and 
social 
organizations 
Unemployment 
Insurance Total 
     
10 17.7 12.13 0.14 29.97 
20 1.66 5.10 0.00 6.77 
30 12.00 1.00 0.23 13.23 
40 7.40 0.33 0.52 8.25 
50 8.25 0.57 0.00 8.83 
60 2.72 0.13 0.09 2.94 
70 4.94 0.43 0.00 5.37 
80 2.93 0.11 0.23 3.28 
90 2.56 0.84 0.00 3.40 
100 4.40 0.09 0.00 4.48 
Mean 
 
6.41 2.06 0.12 8.58 
Note: Values are in 10,000 Korean won at constant 1995 prices. 
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Table 7 
Panel Estimation Results 
 
 Entire Period Before the Crisis During the Crisis 
 Logit Tobit Logit Tobit Logit Tobit 
Pre transfer income/103 -0.058 -22.159 -0.07 -21.729 -0.822 -55.476 
 (0.79) (3.99)** (0.78) (3.49)** (4.37)** (3.99)**
Public transfers -0.009 -0.481 -0.008 -0.781 -0.003 -0.316 
 (3.52)** (6.50)** (2.94)** (5.99)** (2.88)** (3.99)**
=1 if the head is self-employed 0.246 4.387 0.414 9.292 -0.168 -17.994 
 (0.91) (0.39 (1.24) (0.71) (0.77) (0.94) 
=1 if the head is in agriculture/ 0.746 88.839 0.673 93.469 0.861 70.953 
fisheries/Part-time (2.91)** (7.60)** (2.01)* (6.80)** (4.21)** (3.67)**
=1 if the head is unemployed/ 1.317 167.428 1.363 180.664 1.271 140.177
non-paid (5.04)** (13.49)** (3.93)** (12.00)** (6.09)** (7.13)**
Household size -0.203 -20.082 -0.261 -18.545 -0.22 -27.485 
 (2.28)* (5.30)** (2.12)* (4.16)** (3.38)** (4.50)**
Number of children below 15 0.169 -5.95 0.42 -11.003 0.08 8.752 
 (1.07) (1.09) (1.97)* (1.71) (0.89) (1.01) 
Number of elderly above 60 0.226 37.715 0.242 37.153 0.366 37.708 
 (2.54)* (8.00)** (2.03)* (6.56)** (4.77)** (5.21)**
Age of the head -0.145 -9.085 -0.183 -10.309 -0.054 -2.026 
 (2.55)* (4.30)** (2.41)* (4.13)** (3.84)** (0.62) 
Age squared/103 1.109 93.958 1.406 106.864 0.634 27.282 
 (2.02)* (4.74)** (1.98)* (4.55)** (3.82)** (0.92) 
=1 if the head  is a junior  0.307 8.365 -0.334 0.939 0.129 28.222 
high school graduate (0.58) (0.66) (0.44) (0.06) (0.66) (1.54) 
=1 if the head is a senior  -1.049 -8.703 -1.936 -11.05 -0.082 10.06 
high school graduate (1.88) (0.67 (2.50)* (0.72) (0.41) (0.52) 
=1 if the head is a college   -0.613 52.581 -2.258 45.612 0.696 89.907 
graduate or above   (0.82) (3.52)** (2.16)* (2.62)** (2.96)** (3.94)**
=1 if the head is female -0.143 81.925 -0.86 83.523 0.531 64.768 
 (0.39) (6.82)** (1.59) (5.90)** (2.75)** (3.63)**
=1 if the head resides in urban 2.191 -15.695 35.782 -9.745 -0.371 -27.128 
 (1.81) (1.93) (0.00) (1.03) (2.81)** (2.24)* 
=1 for 1996 0.435 33.262 0.464 35.017   
 (4.08)** (4.00)** (4.25)** (4.07)**   
=1 for 1997 0.627 39.121 0.665 40.458   
 (5.65)** (4.67)** (5.69)** (4.66)**   
=1 for 1998 0.791 36.533     
 (6.81)** (4.27)**     
Constant  -33.079  -22.709  -100.1 
  -0.59  -0.34  -1.08 
Observations 2867 9915 1755 7798 2117 2117 
Number of Households  3076  2979   
Notes: 1) Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 2) * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
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